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been no drastic overall reform of the whole procedural
picture, but that there has been considerable improvement
in detail, particularly in the annulment field, where the
most thoroughgoing revision of an entire area was accom-
plished. The prospect of a unified domestic relations court
in Baltimore City seems still in the future, but there has
been a revival of the movement to consolidate the trial
courts of Baltimore City, and out of such reform, if achieved,
could come the setting up of a unified division of the unified
court for handling domestic relations problems in one place.
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT- CONFLICT
OF LAWS - EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT
Third National Bank in Nashville v. Handy Janey'
In a recent lower court case the following set of facts
confronted the court. One England had purchased an auto-
mobile under a conditional sales contract from an automo-
bile dealer in Nashville, Tennessee. The conditional sales
contract was subsequently assigned to the plaintiff bank.
Without the plaintiff's permission, England drove the car
to Baltimore where he applied to the Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles for a title certificate and as evidence of his
right he presented a bill of sale. The certificate was issued
showing no liens or encumbrances. England thereupon sold
the car to Bankart, a bona fide purchaser for value and with-
out notice of the prior conditional sales contract. Bankart
in turn sold the car to Back, who in turn sold the car to
Martin Brothers, Inc., who sold it to the defendant. The
conditional sales contract being in default the plaintiff
brought an action of replevin against the defendant. Ten-
nessee, where the conditional sale was executed, has no
recording provisions for conditional sales.' The Court was
called upon to decide whose rights were superior, those of
the conditional vendor or a bona fide purchaser for value
without notice who had purchased the car in a direct chain
from the original vendee. The court held that the valid title
of the conditional vendor in Tennessee should be recognized
in Maryland as superior to the rights of a subsequent inno-
cent purchaser. Under our Maryland statutes' the condi-
1 Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, Jan. 17, 1951.
2 Michie's Tennessee Code of 1938, Sec. 7286, merely requires evidence of a
writing in order to retain title in the conditional vendor.
3Md. Code (1951), Art. 21, Sec. 71.
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tional sale unless recorded would not have been valid as to
innocent purchasers.
In the earlier Superior Court case of Commercial Credit
Co. v. Foy,4 a truck was purchased under a conditional sales
contract in North Carolina, which was there recorded. The
purchaser subsequently brought the truck into Maryland
where it was seized by a creditor of the purchaser under a
non-resident attachment. The question then arose as to
priority between the conditional vendor and the attaching
creditor of the purchaser. The Court held the title of the
conditional vendor to be superior to the attaching creditor's
rights and that, under the doctrine of comity, Maryland
courts were bound to recognize conditional sales retaining
title in the vendor which were validly executed in North
Carolina.
A case directly in point with the principal case is Goet-
schius v. Brightman,' in which case an automobile pur-
chased in California under a conditional sales contract was
brought to New York in violation of the contract and with-
out the knowledge of the vendor. The law of California
did not require such sales to be recorded in order to pre-
serve title in the vendor as against creditors of, or innocent
purchasers from, the vendee. The court was of the opinion
that the law of California should govern the transaction,
because the doctrine of comity should require the enforce-
ment of a title valid in the state where it was created, unless
contrary to the policy of New York. This view, that a con-
ditional sales contract valid where executed is valid every-
where, has been adopted by the Restatement of Conflict of
Laws6 and is the overwhelming weight of authority in this
country.
In the Maryland case of Universal Credit Company v.
Marks,' a car was purchased under a conditional sales con-
tract in New York where it was recorded. The conditional
vendee defaulted in his payments and shortly thereafter
drove the car into Maryland. An accident occurred in
Baltimore City seriously damaging the car. The buyer
brought the car to the defendants who were in the auto-
mobile repair business. The defendants were ignorant of
the recording of the conditional sales contract in New York.
The buyer never returned for the car, which was subse-
Baltimore City Court, Daily Record, Dec. 28, 1935.
5 245 N. Y. 186, 156N. E. 660 (1927).
6Secs. 272, 273.
1164 Md. 130, 163 A. 810 (1933). See Arnold, Conditional Sales of Chattela
in Maryland, 1 Md. L. Rev. 187, 193 (1937).
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quently sold to enforce the liens for repairs and storage.'
At public auction the car was sold to the defendant garage-
man and a certificate of title to the car was issued. Several
weeks later the plaintiff, who was the assignee of the con-
ditional sales contract, brought an action of replevin claim-
ing superior title to the car. The court, applying Maryland
law, held that the lien of a Maryland garageman for repairs
is superior to the rights of one claiming the automobile as
vendor under a conditional sales contract executed and
recorded in another state. The Court in construing the
Maryland garageman's lien statute said:
"The Maryland statute creating the lien was de-
signed to assure to those operating foreign automobiles,
in the transitory use of the public ways of the state,
the obtention of prompt repair, replacements, acces-
sories, and storage without delay or question, and to
make certain that the garageman would be paid or have
the means of securing payment for the necessities
furnished. The statute was the expression of a public
policy."9
Reasons offered for protecting the garageman's lien in addi-
tion to public policy, are that the buyer has ostensible
ownership of the car and the fact that repairs will tend to
benefit the car. As to the conflict of laws problem the court
speaking through Judge Parke said:
"In a contract of conditional sale, the law of where
it was made and where -it is to be performed, as a rule,
governs its construction and operation in all states, but
the validity of the contract will not be sustained in
another state should it contravene the settled policy
of the foreign state."'"
This statement recognizing the lex loci contractus rule
would seem to put Maryland squarely in line with the
majority view.
It is upon the ground of public policy that we find ex-
ceptions to the general rule, which recognizes the law of
the place where the contract was made as controlling. The
leading case is Turnbull v. Cole," in which the Colorado
Supreme Court refused to uphold the rights of a conditional
vendor on a conditional sales contract executed in Utah
8 Md. Code (1951), Art. 63, See. 41.
9 Supra, n. 7, 143.
Supra, n. 7, 141.
"70 Colo. 364, 201 Pac. 887, 25 A. L. R. 1149 (1921).
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as against an innocent purchaser without notice in Colorado.
The court in its opinion said:
"It is settled in this jurisdiction that (conditional
sale) contracts ... reserving a secret lien to the vendor,
will not be recognized as leaving title in the vendor, as
against interested parties without notice."12
As to the rule of comity the court said:
"Judicial comity does not require us to enforce any
clause of the instrument, which, even if valid under
the lex domicili, conflicts with the policy of our state
relating to property within its borders, or impairs the
rights or remedies of domestic creditors."' 3
The minority view steadfastly contends that conditional
sales are constructively fraudulent as to creditors and other
third persons.' 4 In Louisiana conditional sales are not recog-
nized; however, under the doctrine of comity the condi-
tional vendor in another state will be protected over a
bona fide purchaser from the conditional vendee in Louisi-
ana.'" The majority view which recognizes a conditional
sales contract if valid where executed as being valid every-
where seems to be clearly the better view.'" A large volume
of commercial selling carried on in the United States in-
volves the use of conditional sales contracts. The financing
of automobiles and home appliances are outstanding ex-
amples. If the protection the courts have given to the con-
ditional vendor were to be withdrawn the use of the con-
ditional sale method of financing would greatly decline
thereby directly curtailing consumer buying power.
A problem arising under conditional sales recording
statutes is whether the conditional vendor in one state will
prevail over a bona fide purchaser in another state, when
the conditional sales contract was not recorded in the state
where it was made as prescribed by statute. Most courts
have taken the view that a failure to record the sale in the
state where it was made will defeat the conditional seller,
if the buyer subsequently sells to an innocent purchaser in
12 Ibid, 887. Parenthetical material added.
Ibid, 888.
' Castle v. Commercial Investment Trust Corporation, 100 Colo. 191, 66
P. 2d 804 (1937) ; Rice Street Motors v. Smith, et al., 167 Pa. Super. 159,
74 A. 2d 535 (1950) ; Willys Overland Co. v. Chapman, 206 S. W. 978 (Tex.
Civ. Ap., 1918).
1B Overland Texarkana Co. v. Cickly, 152 La. 662, 94 So. 138 (1922);
Securities Sales Co. v. Blackwell, 167 La. 667, 120 So. 45 (1929).
UClyde Iron Works v. Frerichs, 203 F. 637 (5th Cir., 1913) ; Harrison v.
Broadway Motor Co., 128 Miss. 766, 91 So. 453, 25 A. L. R. 1148 (1922);
Cleveland Machine Works v. Lang, 67 N. H. 348, 31 A. 20 (1893).
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another state. Thus if a chattel is purchased under a con-
ditional sales contract in Maine, and there is a failure on
the part of the conditional vendor to record it in Maine,
subsequent creditors of the conditional vendee attaching
the property in New Hampshire will prevail over the con-
ditional vendor.17 The Restatement of Conflict of Laws says:
"Whether a conditional sale is effective to enable the
vendor to retain title is determined by the law of the
state where the chattel is at the time of sale."'"
Quite often in conditional sales contracts it is contem-
plated or understood by the parties at the time the sale is
made that the goods or chattels covered by the sale are to
be used in another state. The question then arising is the
law of which state shall govern. In situations of this type,
where the parties intended at the time of the sale that the
goods were to be used in another state, the majority of
courts regard the law of the state in which the contract is
to be carried out and where the goods are to be held under
the conditional sale as governing. 9 In determining who will
be protected, the conditional seller or the purchasers and
attaching creditors of the buyer, it becomes necessary to
ascertain whether the buyer has removed the goods with
or without the seller's consent. If the goods have been
removed wrongfully without the seller's consent either
express or implied it clearly is the better rule to protect
the conditional seller's reserved title.2" The reasoning be-
hind this is not so much that the purchasers and attaching
creditors are not innocent, but that they will not be able
to claim title through the conditional buyer who is a wrong-
doer in removing the goods without the seller's consent.
On the other hand, if the goods have been removed with
the express or implied consent of the conditional seller,
purchasers and attaching creditors in the state to which the
goods have been removed will be given priority over the
conditional seller. In these cases the courts reason that it
was the conditional seller's consent that enabled the buyer
to remove the goods which were subsequently disposed of.2'
Thus it is possible to say from these cases that the rights of
17 Davis v. Osgood, 69 N. H. 427, 44 A. 432 (1899).
Is Sec. 272.
1 9 Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664 (1876) ; Beggs
v. Baretls, 73 Conn. 132, 46 A. 874 (1900) ; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS, Sec. 276.
20 C. I. T. Corporation v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S. E. 659 (1938) ; United
Construction Co. v. Milam, 124 F. 2d 670 (6th Cir., 1942).
= STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, (2nd Ed., 1951), p. 397.
[VOL. XIII
1953] 3RD. NAT. BANK v. HANDY JANEY
the parties will be determined by whether the removal was
wrongful or not.
The Uniform Conditional Sales Act,2 which has not been
enacted in Maryland, contains provisions which attempt to
reconcile some of the conflict of laws problems. Article 14
of the act provides that if the goods held under a conditional
sales contract are removed to a new filing district, the con-
ditional seller has ten days after notice that the goods are
in a foreign state to file such record in the state in which the
goods are located. Failure to register within ten days after
notice would render the property attachable by creditors
of the buyer and would also protect innocent purchasers.
The proposed Uniform Commercial Code, which has not
been adopted by any state legislature at the time of this
writing, has a section dealing with secured transactions and
the conflicts problem.23 This section says:
"If the security interest was already perfected under
the law of the jurisdiction where the property was kept
before being brought into this state, the security in-
terest continues perfected here for four months and
also thereafter if within the four month period it is
perfected here. The security interest may also be per-
fected here after the expiration of the four month
period; in such case perfection dates from the time of
perfection in this state. If the security interest was not
perfected under the law of the jurisdiction where the
property was kept before being brought into this state
it may be perfected here, in such case perfection dates
from the time of perfection in this state."
This section seems to give the conditional vendor a four
month period of grace within which to ascertain that the
chattel has been removed to another jurisdiction and to
perfect his title in the new jurisdiction by appropriate
filing. Attaching creditors and purchasers in good faith
from the conditional buyer will not prevail over the vendor
if the conditional vendor records before the expiration of
the four month period. The recording would no doubt
relate back and have priority over their claims.
The holding in the principal case seems clearly correct.
The conditional vendor in Tennessee in the absence of any
recording laws in that state has not failed in any duty to
third persons. He could not record because there was no
statute requiring recording of conditional sales contracts.
n UNIFoaM LAWS ANNOTATED, Vol. 2.
" Uniform Commercial Code - Official Draft (1952), Sec. 9-103 (3).
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Generally at common law such transactions were held valid,
and not against public policy. 4 Not to protect the vendor
under the circumstances would be giving the automobile
practically some of the attributes of negotiability. On the
other hand, the bona fide purchaser is not left completely
without a remedy. He may still bring an action against his
immediate vendor for the breach of the implied warranty of
title.2 5 The warranty sections of the Uniform Sales Act have
been held to apply to the sale of secondhand goods.2"
In a second suit the parties appeared in order to deter-
mine among themselves the respective damages resulting
from the failure of title in the fraudulent vendor.2 As
stated above, when England, the conditional vendee in the
previous suit, brought the car into Maryland he traded it
to Bankart in exchange for another car. Several days later
Bankart sold the car to Back for $1920. A few months
thereafter Back sold the car to Martin Motors for $1995.
The latter party on the very same day sold the car to the
defendant Handy Janey for $2450. The defendant also pur-
chased accessories from Martin Motors for $210. Seven
months elapsed before the plaintiff learned of the where-
abouts of the car and brought replevin proceedings.
The problem that presents itself is whether this series
of transactions should be treated as four separate sales or
whether they should be treated as one unbroken chain in
which damages to successive purchasers all flow from the
original warrantor (Bankart) who obtained the car from
the fraudulent seller and thereby set in motion the succeed-
ing chain of sales. The court held that each sale should be
regarded as a separate transaction and not as an unbroken
chain and that the judgment obtained by the last purchaser
against his vendor does not fix the amount of damages
owed by previous purchasers.
Under the Uniform Sales Act,28 every sale of goods or
chattels carries with it the three implied warranties of title;
namely the right to sell, quiet possession, and against en-
cumbrances. All three of these implied warranties were
breached by the successive vendors because of the exist-
ence of title in the plaintiff, the original vendor. Some
courts treat these implied warranties of title as running
with the chattel down to the subsequent vendee so as to
1Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 (1886).
2 Uniform Sales Act, Sec. 13, Md. Code (1951), Art. 83, Sec. 31.
2 Standard Brands Incorporated v. Consolidated Badger Cooperative, 89
F. Supp. 5 (E. D. Wisc., 1950).
Superior Court of Baltimore City, Daily Record, Mar. 7, 1951.
Supra, n. 25.
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entitle him to recover for its breach against the original
seller.29 The great weight of authority, however, is that the
benefit of a warranty either express or implied does not
run with the chattel so as to give a subsequent purchaser a
right of action against the original seller because of either
defects in title or quality."0 The Court of Appeals of Mary-
land has consistently held that in the absence of privity of
contract, the benefit of the implied warranties do not inure
to a subpurchaser1'
A leading case in point treating a series of sales of the
same chattel as separate transactions is Smith v. Williams.2
In that case the defendant sold some personal property to
plaintiff with a warranty. The plaintiff thereupon sold the
property to a third party with a similar warranty. Para-
mount title was asserted and the third party was forced to
surrender the goods to their rightful owner. The third party
thereupon sued his immediate seller (plaintiff) for breach
of warranty and recovered the purchase price plus the
attorney's fees of the third party expended in defending
the action against the real owner, and in addition the attor-
ney's fees necessary to bring the action against the plaintiff.
Then the plaintiff sued the defendant claiming as damages
the entire amount recovered by the third party and also
the attorney's fees of the plaintiff in bringing the action.
The defendant moved to strike out the amount of the costs
and the attorney fees of the preceding action in which the
plaintiff had been sued by the third party. The defendant's
motion was overruled and on appeal the lower court was
reversed. The court said:
"Each sale is a separate transaction. Each vendor is
liable for his own contract, and to the extent thereof.
But he cannot enlarge his prior vendor's obligation
beyond that fixed by law. The measure of damages is
the purchase money, with interest and expenses prop-
erly incurred by the vendee in attempting to defend
his title; but not for expenses incurred by others in
asserting or defending rights warranted by their im-
mediate vendor, even though they be also derived by
a chain of title from the remote warrantor."33
Pinney v. Geraghty, 209 App. Div. 630, 205 N. Y. S. 645 (1924) ; Thurston
v. Spratt, 52 Maine 202 (1863).
0 Hood v. Warren, 205 Ala. 332, 87 So. 524 (1921) ; Crocker v. Barron, 234
S. W. 1032 (Mo., 1921).
Flaccomio v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 100 A. 510 (1916) ; Poplar v. Hoch-
schild Kohn & Co., 180 Md. 389, 393, 24 A. 2d 783 (1942); Vaccarino v.
Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943).
81117 Ga. 782,45 S. E. 394 (1903).
uIbid, 394.
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The "unbroken chain" theory, on the other hand, is
where the judgment against the last purchaser is passed
back to the original seller who is bound to make good to
the purchaser all his losses resulting from lack of title. If
the purchaser or any subpurchaser is sued in replevin or
trover, or any action involving the question of title and
if he gives notice to his vendor of the pending action and
its nature, then it has been held a judgment is conclusive
evidence against such vendor. 4 The case of Thurston v.
Spratt,3 ' helps illustrate the "unbroken chain" theory. In
that case the plaintiff and defendant exchanged horses. The
plaintiff subsequently sold one of the horses he had received
from the defendant to A who then sold the horse to B who
in turn sold the horse to C. The true owner of the horse
brought a replevin suit against C who immediately notified
his immediate vendor B to appear and to defend the suit.
B thereupon notified his immediate vendor A to appear
and defend who in turn served notice on the plaintiff who
in turn served notice on the defendant. The real owner was
allowed to replevy the horse. The defendant had failed to
defend the action whereupon C the last vendee was required
to pay the costs plus his own attorney's fees. Thereafter,
B repaid C and A repaid B and the plaintiff repaid A.
Finally the plaintiff sued the defendant to recover the value
of the horse plus the costs and attorney's fees expended
by C in defending the suit.
The court held that the plaintiff could recover. The
court said:
"If the purchaser, or any subsequent vendee is sued
in replevin or trover, or in any other action involving
the question of title, if he gives notice to his vendor of
the pendency of the action and its nature, the judgment
is conclusive evidence against such vendor."36
Further on in the opinion, Judge Kent says:
"It can make no difference that there are inter-
mediate purchasers, and that the suit is against the last
one, if the question of title is the sole matter in con-
troversy."3'
Farnham v. Chapman, 60 Vt. 338, 14 A. 690 (1888); Kelly v. Forty-
Second Street, etc. R. Co., 37 App. Div. 500, 55 N. Y. S. 1096 (1899).
Supra, n. 29.
1 Supra, n. 29, 205. This rule treats warranties of title the same as cove-
nants of title are treated in respect to realty. Marsh v. Smith, 73 Iowa 295,
34 N. W. 866 (1887); Elliot v. Saufley, 89 Ky. 52, 11 S. W. 200 (1889);
Richmond v. Ames, 164 Mass. 467,41 N. E. 671 (1895).
Supra, n. 29, 205.
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Thus under the "unbroken chain" theory the amount of the
judgment in favor of the subpurchaser would also serve as
the measure of damages between the original seller and the
first purchaser. Hence, where there have been successive
sales accompanied by implied or express warranties and a
breach would arise from an outstanding title, and if costs
and attorney's fees were carried forward and finally paid
by the original warrantor, then it is quite likely that the
final figure would be an amount greatly in excess of the
original value of the chattel. Although it may appear to be
an undue hardship on the original purchaser in making
him sustain a loss of an amount greater than what he had
originally paid for the chattel, he still has a cause of action
against his fraudulent vendor. As a practical matter, it is
doubtful, if any actual recovery could be realized from
such a fraudulent vendor.
In the principal case the fairest possible result was
reached. Each of the parties was allowed to recover back
from their immediate purchaser the amount they had paid
for the car. The accessories that had been added to the car
were paid for by the plaintiff who replevied the car. The
costs of the various parties were equally divided among
them.
EFFECT OF IMPORT-EXPORT AND COMMERCE
CLAUSES ON FRANCHISE TAX MEASURED
BY GROSS RECEIPTS
Canton R. Co. v. Rogan1
Western Md. R. Co. v. Rogan2
The State of Maryland imposed on steam railroad com-
panies a non-discriminatory franchise tax measured by
gross receipts apportioned to the length of their lines within
the state in lieu of all other taxes.3 Appellant, Canton Rail-
road, engaged in switching freight cars from its piers to
lines of connecting railroads, wharfage, weighing of loaded
freight cars, storage, and other services offered by a marine
terminal. The appellant contested the validity of the tax
under the import-export and commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution.
1340 U. S. 511 (1951).
'340 U. S. 520 (1951), argued and decided at the same time.
8 Md. Code (1951), Art. 81, Secs. 127, 128.
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